GWADAR, BALOCHISTAN: At the edge of Pakistan’s southwestern coast, the Arabian Sea stretches toward one of the world’s most important maritime regions. Gwadar is often described in Pakistan primarily as a port and as a centrepiece of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, but its significance extends far beyond the coastline of Balochistan. The port sits close to the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz, linking Pakistan to maritime routes that carry energy, goods and people across the Indian Ocean and onward to East and Southeast Asia.
Thousands of kilometres away, the South China Sea is at the centre of a different set of geopolitical tensions. Territorial claims, military competition, freedom of navigation, fisheries, energy resources and the interpretation of international maritime law have made the waterway one of the most closely watched maritime spaces in the world. Yet for Pakistan, the South China Sea is not as distant as it appears on a map. It is part of the same interconnected maritime system through which Chinese trade, energy supplies and commercial shipping move between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.
That raises an increasingly important question for Pakistan: as its economic and strategic relationship with China deepens, how much is the country’s own maritime future becoming connected to developments in the wider Indo-Pacific?
Gwadar is at the centre of that question. The port has been developed as a major component of CPEC, with China playing a central role in its development and associated infrastructure. Pakistan has envisioned Gwadar as a gateway for trade between China, Pakistan, Central Asia, the Gulf and other regional markets. Roads, the port’s free zone and other infrastructure have been developed with the aim of creating an integrated commercial and logistics hub.
But the importance of any port ultimately depends on what happens after a ship leaves its harbour.
A vessel arriving at Gwadar does not operate in isolation. Its cargo is connected to shipping companies, insurance markets, energy suppliers, ports, international trade routes and consumers across several countries. A disruption in one part of this system can therefore have consequences far beyond the immediate location of the disruption.
This is where the South China Sea becomes relevant to Pakistan.
The waterway is one of the world’s most important maritime trade and energy corridors. The United States Energy Information Administration estimates that around 28 million barrels per day of petroleum and petroleum products passed through the South China Sea in 2023, representing about 37 percent of global maritime petroleum shipments. The same year, around 6.7 trillion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas moved through the waterway, accounting for roughly 34 percent of global LNG trade.
The figures illustrate why the South China Sea matters far beyond the countries bordering it. It is a major artery of the Asian economy, connecting the Indian and Pacific oceans and facilitating trade between major manufacturing and energy-consuming economies.
China is particularly important to this maritime system. The country is deeply dependent on maritime trade for energy supplies, raw materials and exports, while its manufacturing economy is connected to markets throughout Asia and beyond. Much of this trade passes through a network of sea lanes extending from the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca and into the South China Sea.
Pakistan sits on the western side of that broader network.
Gwadar’s location near the Arabian Sea gives it a potentially important position in the regional maritime economy. The port is close to the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant share of the world’s oil and gas trade passes. From there, commercial routes extend eastward across the Indian Ocean and toward the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea.
The geography does not mean that Gwadar can replace established ports or that it can provide an alternative to every existing maritime route. Such claims often simplify a much more complicated commercial reality. Shipping decisions are determined by cargo demand, costs, infrastructure, connectivity, reliability, security, insurance and the availability of established logistics networks.
For Gwadar to become a major regional hub, its geographical location must therefore be matched by commercially competitive infrastructure and sustained cargo activity.
This remains one of the most important questions surrounding the port’s future.
Gwadar has received significant investment and infrastructure development under CPEC, but the port’s long-term success will ultimately be measured by whether it can attract regular shipping services, generate sustained cargo volumes and become commercially useful to businesses beyond individual government or infrastructure projects.
That is also where Pakistan’s relationship with China becomes more complicated than a simple bilateral economic partnership.
China’s maritime interests extend from its own coastline through Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean to the Middle East and Africa. Gwadar is therefore part of a much larger network of Chinese economic and commercial interests across the Indo-Pacific.
For Pakistan, this creates opportunities but also vulnerabilities.
The closer Pakistan becomes economically connected with China, the more important the stability of the maritime routes connecting the two countries becomes. A major disruption in one part of the network could affect shipping costs, delivery times, energy prices and the movement of goods.
The impact would not necessarily be immediate or direct. A crisis in the South China Sea, for example, would not mean that ships travelling to Pakistan would automatically stop. But increased military tensions, restrictions on shipping, higher insurance premiums, rerouting or disruption of energy supplies could create economic effects across the wider maritime system.
Pakistan’s dependence on imported energy makes this particularly significant.
The Strait of Malacca provides another important link. The waterway connects the Indian Ocean with the Pacific and is one of the world’s major energy and commercial chokepoints. Oil and gas shipments moving through the Strait of Malacca eventually connect with the South China Sea and the wider East Asian market.
The result is a chain of interconnected maritime spaces stretching from the Persian Gulf to East Asia.
For Pakistan, that chain begins much closer to home than the South China Sea.
It begins around the Arabian Sea.
This is why Gwadar should perhaps be understood not simply as a CPEC port, but as part of Pakistan’s broader maritime relationship with the Indo-Pacific.
Such a perspective would also require Pakistan to look beyond the traditional debate over whether Gwadar is primarily an economic or strategic project. In reality, the two dimensions are increasingly difficult to separate.
A port needs security to attract commercial shipping. Commercial shipping creates economic value that can strengthen a country’s strategic position. At the same time, geopolitical competition can increase the cost and risk of operating ports and shipping routes.
Gwadar has experienced this challenge directly.
Security concerns in Balochistan have affected Chinese nationals, infrastructure and other economic activity associated with CPEC. For international businesses, security is not simply a political or military issue. It is part of the calculation of whether a particular port or trade route is commercially attractive.
Shipping companies consider security risks alongside cargo demand, port efficiency, insurance costs and connectivity. If operating through a particular location becomes too expensive or unpredictable, companies can choose alternative routes or ports.
For Gwadar, therefore, improving security is inseparable from improving its commercial prospects.
But there is another part of Gwadar’s maritime story that cannot be ignored: the people who already depend on the sea.
For generations, fishing communities along the Makran coast have relied on the Arabian Sea for their livelihoods. Gwadar’s transformation into a modern port is taking place alongside an existing coastal economy built around fishing, boat making and related activities.
The future of Gwadar will therefore not only be determined by how many ships enter the port. It will also be determined by whether the development of the maritime economy creates meaningful opportunities for the communities living along the coast.
Local fishermen have repeatedly raised concerns about access to fishing grounds, marine activity, facilities, markets and livelihoods. These concerns are important because a modern port and a traditional fishing economy do not necessarily have to compete with each other. With appropriate planning, investment and consultation, they can potentially become part of the same coastal economy.
This local dimension is often missing from international discussions about Gwadar.
From a distance, the port is discussed in terms of China, CPEC, strategic competition and the Indian Ocean. On the ground, however, its development is also about fishermen, traders, workers, transporters and families whose livelihoods depend on the coast.
That tension between global strategy and local reality provides an important lesson for the wider Indo-Pacific.
The South China Sea itself is not simply a geopolitical map of competing territorial claims. Millions of people depend on its fisheries, shipping routes and coastal economies. The decisions taken by governments and militaries in the region therefore have consequences for communities that are often far removed from diplomatic negotiations.
The South China Sea disputes are also fundamentally connected to international maritime law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Questions about territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, freedom of navigation, fishing rights and offshore resources are not unique to Southeast Asia. They are relevant to every coastal state, including Pakistan.
Pakistan has its own extensive coastline and maritime interests in the Arabian Sea. The country’s understanding of international maritime law therefore matters not only in relation to the South China Sea but also to its own long-term maritime policy.
For Pakistan, supporting a stable maritime order based on predictable rules is in its own interest.
That does not require Islamabad to take sides in every dispute between China and Southeast Asian countries. It does, however, require Pakistan to understand how maritime rules, regional security arrangements and international norms are evolving.
This is particularly important as competition between major powers increasingly extends into the maritime domain.
The United States and China remain the two most influential strategic powers in the Indo-Pacific, while Southeast Asian countries seek to protect their own interests while managing relationships with both. ASEAN has repeatedly emphasised dialogue, cooperation and peaceful approaches to maritime disputes.
For countries such as Pakistan, this offers a broader lesson.
Maritime security should not be understood only through the presence of warships or the possibility of military conflict. It also includes the safety of commercial shipping, protection of fishing communities, prevention of trafficking and piracy, search and rescue, environmental protection, cybersecurity and the security of critical maritime infrastructure.
This broader understanding could become increasingly important for Pakistan as Gwadar develops.
The country has traditionally viewed its maritime security primarily through the lens of naval defence and protection of its coastline. But a commercially expanding maritime economy requires a much broader security framework.
Ports, shipping networks, digital systems, undersea cables, fishing fleets and energy routes are all part of the same ecosystem.
That ecosystem is increasingly regional rather than national.
A container arriving at Gwadar may have originated in China. Its components may have travelled through several countries. The ship carrying it may have passed through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. Its insurance may have been arranged in another financial centre, while its final destination could be somewhere in Pakistan or Central Asia.
The movement of a single shipment can therefore illustrate how closely Asian economies have become connected.
This interconnectedness is also why maritime disruptions have the potential to spread.
The recent disruptions to shipping in the Red Sea demonstrated how events in one maritime region can force commercial vessels to take longer routes, increasing travel time, fuel consumption and costs. The lesson is relevant to the Indo-Pacific: maritime security problems rarely remain confined to the geographical location where they begin.
For Pakistan, this should encourage a more comprehensive approach to maritime policy.
Gwadar needs reliable road and future rail connections, efficient customs systems, energy and water infrastructure, skilled workers and predictable security. It also needs stronger connections with international shipping networks.
At the same time, Pakistan needs greater expertise in maritime economics, maritime law and Indo-Pacific affairs.
The country’s maritime debate has often been dominated by strategic and military discussions. There is comparatively less public understanding of the commercial mechanisms that determine whether ports succeed or fail.
This gap matters.
If Pakistan wants Gwadar to become a regional maritime hub, it needs to understand not only the geopolitical value of the port but also the commercial realities of international shipping.
It also needs to engage with countries beyond China.
Gwadar’s long-term viability would be strengthened if it could serve a broad range of commercial partners and regional markets, including the Gulf, Central Asia, East Asia and other parts of the Indian Ocean region.
That would make the port less dependent on a single corridor or economic relationship and would strengthen Pakistan’s position as a regional connectivity state.
The same principle applies to maritime diplomacy.
Pakistan can deepen its relationship with China while simultaneously developing stronger maritime cooperation with Southeast Asian, Gulf and Indian Ocean countries. Engagement does not necessarily require choosing one side in the strategic competition between major powers.
For Pakistan, the priority should be protecting its own economic and maritime interests.
That means advocating peaceful dispute resolution, supporting freedom of commercial navigation, strengthening maritime law expertise and participating more actively in regional discussions about maritime security.
It also means recognising that the Indo-Pacific is not simply a term used by major powers in strategic documents.
It is an interconnected economic and maritime space through which Pakistan’s own trade and energy supplies move.
This is perhaps the most important connection between Gwadar and the South China Sea.
The two places are separated by thousands of kilometres, but they are linked by the same maritime system.
Gwadar stands near the western end of a network that extends through the Indian Ocean, across the Strait of Malacca and into the South China Sea. China is one of the most important economic actors within that network. Pakistan’s growing relationship with China therefore gives Islamabad a direct economic interest in the stability of the wider maritime environment.
The question for Pakistan is no longer simply whether Gwadar can become a successful port.
It is whether Pakistan can understand and participate effectively in the maritime system in which Gwadar is located.
That requires looking beyond the port itself.
It requires looking east.
It requires understanding the South China Sea not only as a dispute between competing claimants, but as a critical artery of Asian trade.
It requires recognising that maritime security is about much more than warships and territorial claims.
And it requires placing the people of Gwadar, particularly the communities whose livelihoods depend on the sea, at the centre of the country’s maritime development.
For decades, Pakistan’s relationship with the sea has been discussed largely through Karachi and the country’s naval security. Gwadar is changing that geography.
The port has the potential to give Pakistan a stronger role in the wider Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific economy. But that potential will only become reality if infrastructure, commercial activity, security, local livelihoods and regional diplomacy develop together.
The South China Sea offers Pakistan another reason to think about that future now.
Because the maritime future of Asia will not be shaped in one sea alone.
It will be shaped by the connections between them.
And somewhere on the western edge of that network, at the coast of Balochistan, Gwadar is waiting to find its place.
